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I. INTRODUCTION
In an era flourishing with scientific innovation, the importance of
pharmaceutical drug development is evident. Pharmaceutical drugs aid in
the fight against cancer, heart disease, mental illness, and a plethora of other
diseases that affect the daily lives of many Americans.1 However, for
* J.D. candidate 2004, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center;
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1. See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Delivering on the
Promise of Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Need to Maintain Strong and Predictable
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something that affects life so tremendously, there is a drawback-the cost of
pharmaceuticals. Due to the patent protection provided for new drugs,
pioneer companies may enjoy a twenty-year monopoly.2 Patent exclusivity
available for an innovator is a key factor in promoting the entrance of new
drugs to the market. Without the exclusivity provided to pioneer drug
companies, the rate of innovation would likely be dampened. With the
temporary monopoly, pioneer drug companies may set drug prices at a level
necessary to regain the investment of discovery and research. Yet, with the
approval of new drugs comes the opportunity for a generic company to rely
on a pioneer company's studies to apply for approval of a generic drug even
before the patent expires on the pioneer drug.3
The complicated process of pioneer drug and generic drug approval is
detailed in the Hatch-Waxman Act ("Act").4 Although criticized for
containing loopholes that allegedly allow pioneer companies to extend their
exclusivity, 5 the Act serves the purpose Congress originally intended.
6
Currently, a bill is being reviewed by Congress, which will amend the Act
in order to promote an increase in generic drug marketing. However, the
provisions of the bill do not accurately address the problems of the Hatch-
Waxman Act. Instead, an alternate solution is more advisable to precisely
reflect the original purposes of the Act. Furthermore, it is the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) that ultimately decides whether a new or generic
drug is approved for marketing.8
The purpose of this note is to examine whether reformation of the
Hatch-Waxman Act is the appropriate solution to further promote the dual
purposes of the Act. Part H1 reviews the importance of patent rights in
Intellectual Property Rights 4, available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/policy/2002-
06-24-436.pdf (Apr. 22, 2002).
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
4. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271
(2000)).
5. Julie Appleby & Jayne O'Donnell, Consumers Pay as Drug Firms Fight Over
Generics, USA Today, June 6, 2002, at IA. Senator Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., criticized the
pioneer companies when stating, "'These companies figure out a new way to keep the dollars
rolling in, stooping to a new low every day to maintain their exclusivity rights."' Id. at 2A.
6. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 1, 37 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2670.
7. See Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2001, S. 812, 107th
Cong. (2001).
8. Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 88,90 (D.D.C. Cir. 2001).
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stimulating innovation, especially in the pharmaceutical industry. Part 111
explores the history and provisions of the Act, which create a balance
between the interests of generic drug and pioneer drug companies. Part IV
discusses the successful enforcement of the Act by the FDA and the courts.
Part V details the inadequate provisions of the bill introduced in the Senate
to reform the Act. Finally, the note concludes by suggesting a possible
alternative to revising the Act to further maintain balance between
promoting generic marketing and pioneer innovation.
11. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATENT LAW AND DRUG APPROVAL
Patent rights are an important part of society, stemming back to the
United States Constitution. 9 Patents serve "to promote invention, to encour-
age development and commercialization of inventions, and to encourage
inventors to disclose their inventions."' 0 A patent issued by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office provides an inventor with the right to
exclude others from manufacturing, using or selling the patented invention
for twenty years." The right to exclude others is exemplified in the right to
sue those who infringe upon the patent. "Patent infringement is defined as
making, using, offering to sell, or selling a patented invention without
authority."' 12 Without patent protection, an invention could be copied by
competitors at significantly lower prices, thereby reducing an inventor's
ability to recover costs associated with innovation. 13
9. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent
to Technology Suppression, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 389, 426 (2002) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)). The author discusses how the purpose of the
Constitution's intellectual property clause was to instill in Congress the power to promote
public interest by providing patent rights. Id. at 447-48.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); Laura Giles, Note, Promoting Generic Drug Availability:
Reforming the Hatch-Waxman Act to Prevent Unnecessary Delays to Consumers, 75 St.
John's L. Rev. 357, 360 (2001). "The [Patent and Trademark Office] was established under
the Department of Commerce to create a government agency to decide what ideas and
products were worthy of this protection." Plain Talk About Prescription Drug Patents, at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/policy/02.21.2002.426.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
12. Giles, supra note 11, at 364; see 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a).
13. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 229 (2001).
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The profit protection provided by patents is clearly evidenced in
statutes regarding drug innovation. 14 In 1984, Congress enacted the Hatch-
Waxman Act, also known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, which amended Title 21, section 355 of the United
States Code (known as the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) and Title
35, sections 156 and 271 of the United States Code, which are sections of the
patent code.' 5 In relation to patent protection, section 156 was amended in
order to provide pioneer drug companies with an extension on their patents
based on the time lost in obtaining FDA approval.16 In addition, section 271
was amended *to allow generic drug companies to apply for FDA approval
before the pioneer drug patent expires.' 7 The provision authorizes generic
drug companies to conditionally infringe on pioneer drug patents without the
consequences of a patent infringement lawsuit.' 8 However, the authorization
has its limits. The exemption from infringement only allows generic drug
companies to infringe so long as it is related to gaining FDA approval.' 9 If
generic drug companies go beyond simply seeking approval by the FDA,
pioneer drug companies may seek money damages or injunctive relief in
order to protect their patent interests.2°
III. HISTORY OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
A. Drug Approval Process Before 1984
Before the Act was introduced in 1984, the drug industry was regulated
by the 1962 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
"which required proof that a drug was safe and effective" before the FDA
submitted approval. 2 1 However, the 1962 amendments did not include
14. See id. at 231.
15. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598, 1603 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§
156, 271 (2000)).
16. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 37.
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); Shashank Upadhye, Understanding Patent
Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. § 2 71(e): The Collisions Between Patent, Medical Device, and
Drug Laws, 17 Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1, 42-43 (2000).
18. See § 271(e)(3).
19. Upadhye, supra note 17, at 43.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B)-(C).
21. Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They
Outlived Their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative and Legal History of U.S. Law and
Observations for the Future, 39 IDEA 389, 396 (1999) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1994)).
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provisions for a separate and more economical approval process for generic
22drugs. Instead, generic drug companies were forced to go through the same
procedures for FDA approval as pioneer drug companies-filing a New
Drug Application (NDA) .23 However, the procedure for filing an NDA is
complex and costly considering that:
The NDA is a massive report on the drug, and contains summaries
of all the animal and human studies conducted, demonstrating that
the new drug is safe and efficacious, details of how and where the
new drug will be manufactured, how the manufacturing process is
validated, how the drug's performance will be maintained, stability
tests on the drug, and how the drug will be packaged, labeled, and
marketed.24
Due to the lack of finances to undertake the expensive process of clinical
studies to prove a drug was safe and effective, few generic drugs entered the
25market by filing NDAs.
B. Provisions of the Hatch- Waxman Act
As a result of long debates over the contents of the Act, Congress
finally came to a compromise and President Ronald Reagan enacted the bill
into law on September 24, 1984.26 Provisions of the Act enable inventors to
have an opportunity to recover development costs, and to ultimately make a
profit off of the specified exclusivity period.27  In addition to recovering
development time, the Act also gives generic drug companies advantages
unavailable before 1984.
The first advantage to generics is evident in Title I of the Act, which
amended section 355 of Title 21 of the United States Code by introducing an
22. Id.
23. Id. at 396-97 (citing Alan H. Kaplan, Fifty Years of Drug Amendments Revisited:
In Easy-To-Swallow Capsule Form, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 179, 188-89 (1995)).
24. William M. Brown, A "Highly Artificial Act of Infringement," Indeed, But It Can
Still Cost You Attorneys' Fees ... Comment on Yamanouchi v. Danbury, 33 U.W.L.A. L.
Rev. 117, 125 (2001).
25. See Engelberg, supra note 21, at 397.
26. Id. at 407; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1605 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000); 35
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (2000)).
27. Engelberg, supra note 21, at 406. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 156 (discussing the
patent extension period available to NDA applicants).
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abbreviated process for generic drug availability. 28 Through an Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA), a generic drug company may rely on the
accomplishments of pioneer drug companies to obtain faster FDA ap-
29proval. Ultimately, the ANDA allows generic drugs to reach the market at
reasonable costs to consumers. 3  Furthermore, Title HI aided generics by
amending section 271 of Title 35 of the United States Code to allow generic
drug companies to conditionally infringe on pioneer drug companies
patents. So long as the infringement is for the purpose of obtaining FDA
approval of a generic drug, a generic drug company's use of patented
methods or products does not constitute infringement. 32  In addition to
allowing generic drugs to be approved based upon the safety and efficacy of
a pioneer drug, the Act also provides a way for a generic drug company to
challenge a pioneer's patent.
33
1. Generic Drug Approval Process
As discussed, one of the purposes of the Act is to "enabl[e] competitors
to bring low-cost, generic copies of [pioneer] drugs to the market., 34 Instead
of filing an NDA with the FDA, as was required before 1984, generic drug
companies may file an ANDA with information detailing that the generic
drug is the bioequivalent of a previously approved pioneer drug, referred to
as the "listed drug. ' ' 35 Essentially, a generic drug must contain the same
36
active ingredient as the listed drug, but the inactive ingredients may vary.
Along with bioequivalency information, the ANDA applicant must certify
28. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
29. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550).
30. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
32. Id. Section 271(e)(1) states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the
United States or import into the United States a patented invention ... solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs ....
Id.
33. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
34. Andrx Pharns., Inc., 276 F.3d at 1371. The other purpose of the Act is to
"induc[e] pioneering research and development of new drugs." Id.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
36. Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Shalala, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing
United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 455 (1983)).
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that the drug will not interfere with the listed drug patents of an NDA holder
by submitting
a certification, in the opinion of the applicant and to the best of his
knowledge, with respect to each patent which claims the listed drug
(I) that such patent information has not been filed,
(II) that such patent has expired,
(III) of the date on which such patent will expire, or
(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application
is submitted ....
The specific certification submitted by the generic drug company is referred
to as either a Paragraph I, II, HI, or IV certification.
38
Furthermore, if a generic drug company files an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certification, the company is required to give the patent holder
and the NDA holder notice of the reasons why the patent listed is invalid or
why the generic drug does not infringe on the listed patent.39 According to
the Act, the requisite notice must include a "detailed statement of the factual
and legal basis of the [ANDA] applicant's opinion that the patent is not valid
or will not be infringed.' '40 The purpose of the notice is to provide NDA and
patent holders with an opportunity to protect their patent rights through
"inquiry, investigation or litigation." 41 However, the ANDA applicant is not
required to submit the notice to the FDA.42 The FDA does not review the
notice because
it lacks the expertise in patent law. Moreover, neither the FDA nor
the United States Patent and Trademark Office currently has access
to the additional resources that would be necessary to review these
notices, and a patent certification review system would subject the
agency's decisions to questioning that would require further re-
37. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I-IV).
38. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 276 F.3d at 1371.
39. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i-ii).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii).
41. Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 221 F. Supp. 2d 528, 534 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
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source expenditures and create delays in the statutory patent certi-
43fication and challenge process.
In addition, Paragraph IV certification brings forth another obstacle
generic drug companies must tackle. Pursuant to Title 35, section
271(e)(2)(A), the filing of a Paragraph IV certification is considered an act
of infringement. 44 Subsequent to receiving notice from the ANDA applicant,
the NDA and patent holders have forty-five days to commence a lawsuit
against the generic drug company for patent infringement.45 The Act states:
If the [ANDA] applicant made a [Paragraph IV] certification...
the [FDA] approval shall be made effective immediately unless an
action is brought for infringement of a patent which is the subject
of the certification before the expiration of forty-five days from the
date the notice ... is received. If such an action is brought before
the expiration of such days, the approval shall be made effective
upon the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the
date of the receipt of the notice provided . . . or such shorter or
longer period as the court may order because either party to the ac-
tion failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action .... 46
The thirty-month stay allows the parties to litigate the patent infringement
suit, thereby guaranteeing that the generic drug will not immediately enter
the market.
7
Generic drug companies take a significant risk by filing a Paragraph IV
certification. If the patent holder timely files suit, initiating the stay of
generic drug approval up to thirty months, the generic drug company is
forced to await a court's decision concerning the patent before the generic
may hit the market.48  However, generic drug companies have a great
43. Id. at 788 (GarJarsa, J., concurring).
44. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A); aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 232 (4th
Cir. 2002).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
46. Id.
47. Ben Venue Labs., Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 572, 579
(D.N.J. 2001).
It is important to remember that the purpose of the 30-month stay is not
necessarily to extend the patent holder's monopoly, but to create an adequate window
of time, during which to litigate the question of whether a generic will infringe the
patented product, without actually having to introduce the generic product to the
Id. market.
48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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incentive to file a Paragraph IV certification with their ANDA.49 Under the
Act, the first company to file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification is
granted a 180-day marketing exclusivity period.5 °
Although the 180-day period enables the first ANDA filer with a
Paragraph IV certification to temporarily block out other ANDA applicants
from marketing their versions of the drug, subsequent ANDA filers may be
able to bypass this provision. According to Title 21, section
355(j)(5)(B)(iv), if a second ANDA also containing a Paragraph IV
certification is submitted, the FDA will not approve the application until 180
days after:
(I) the date the Secretary [of the FDA] receives notice from the
applicant under the previous application of the first commercial
marketing of the drug under the previous application, or
(II) the date of a decision of a court in an action described in an
action ... holding the patent which is the subject of the certifica-
tion to be invalid or not infringed, whichever is earlier.5'
Section 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) of the Act includes not only court decisions
finding that the first ANDA filer has not infringed or that the patent is
invalid, but also decisions involving the second ANDA filer. 52 If the NDA
or patent holder sues a second ANDA filer, the case could be resolved prior
to a case against the first ANDA filer. Therefore, a second ANDA filer may
ultimately succeed in obtaining the 180-day exclusivity period, thereby
excluding the first ANDA filer from the market for the period.53  "The
provision allowing a second ANDA filer to trigger the period by a 'court
decision' comports with the statute and the intent of Congress. 54
The various provisions of the Act enable generic drug companies to
reap benefits. The benefits of the 180-day exclusivity period, in addition to
the financial advantages of relying on a pioneer drug company's studies,
49. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., No. IP 99-38-C H/K, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18361, at *53 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 12, 2001).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
51. Id.
52. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 289 F.3d at 778 (citing Teva Pharms., USA, Inc. v. United
States FDA, 182 F.3d 1003, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
53. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 289 F.3d 775, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
"The District of Columbia Circuit has explicitly held that § 355j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) is triggered by
the termination of an action commenced by the second ANDA filer .... Id. (citing Teva
Pharms., 182 F.3d at 1010).
54. Id. at 786 (Garjarsa, J., concurring).
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allow generic drugs to gain approval by the FDA and enter the market at a
rate unknown before 1984. Yet, the Act goes beyond benefiting simply
generic drug companies. Besides promoting competition of low-cost
generics, the Act also allows patent term restoration for pioneer drug
companies.55
2. Patent Right Protection
As a compromise to the provisions of the Act allowing a generic drug
company to rely on a pioneer company's studies to obtain FDA approval, the
patent provisions of the Act provide pioneer drug companies with an
incentive. Since obtaining FDA approval for an innovator drug takes a
considerable amount of time, the patent holder loses time available to profit
56from marketing the drug. Thus, an additional purpose of the Act is to
provide pioneer companies with patent term extensions to make up for the
time involved in regulatory approval." Pioneer companies receive "an
extension [of the patent] term eq1ual to one-half of the time of the investiga-
tional new drug (IND) period."5  The IND period begins when the pioneer
company commences human clinical studies and ends when the FDA
approves the NDA.59
Along with patent term extension, the Act also protects the patent rights
of pioneer companies. If a generic drug company files an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certification, the pioneer company has forty-five days to file a
60lawsuit against the generic company for patent infringement. If the pioneer
company does not file a lawsuit by then, the FDA may approve the ANDA
upon expiration of the forty-five day period.6 1 However, if the pioneer
company does file a lawsuit within the time allotted, approval of the ANDA
is stayed pending
55. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
56. Giles, supra note 11, at 361 (citing David J. Bloch, If It's Regulated Like a
Duck... Uncertainties in Implementing the Patent Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 111, 112 (1999)). "''his loss of patent
protection as a result of regulatory delay is referred to as 'front end distortion."' Id.
57. Id.
58. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the
Drug Development Process, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 187, 190 (1999) (citing 35 U.S.C. §156
(1994)).
59. Id. at 192.
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the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of
the receipt of notice provided [to the NDA and patent holder] or
such shorter or longer period as the court may order because either
party to the action failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the
action, except that-
(I) if before the expiration of such period the court decides that
such patent is invalid or not infringed, the approval shall be made
effective on the date of the court decision,
(II) if before the expiration of such period the court decides that
such patent has been infringed, the approval shall be made effec-
tive on such date as the court orders.., or
(III) if before the expiration of such period the court grants a pre-
liminary injunction prohibiting the applicant form engaging in the
commercial manufacture or sale of the drug until the court decides
the issues of patent validity and infringement and if the court de-
cides that such patent is invalid or not infringed, the approval shall
be made effective on the date of such court decision.
62
The thirty-month stay provision of the Act enables pioneer companies to
protect their patent rights prior to approval of generic drugs for marketing.
63
The provision "is a trade-off for having stripped the pharmaceutical industr-
of the other patent protection afforded to every other U.S. industry."
However, if pioneer companies do not list applicable patents appropriately
relating to FDA approved drug, then pioneer companyies cannot take
advantage of the ANDA stay in order to protect their rights.
65
Restoration of time, which pioneer companies lose in the FDA approval
process, is an adequate measure, considering the tremendous investment
pioneer companies make in developing drugs. Pioneers are able to take
advantage of the extended patent term to regain finances while generics take
advantage of pioneers' financial investments to develop generic versions.
Although the procedures to obtain these advantages are complex, the success
of the intricate drug approval process is evident through the interaction
between pioneers, generics, the FDA, and the courts.
62. Id.
63. aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 232 (4th Cir. 2002).
64. Plain Talk About Prescription Drug Patents, at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/policy/02.01.2002.426.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
65. aaiPharma, 296 F.3d at 232.
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IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT
A. FDA Review and Approval
The FDA is responsible for supporting the public interest,66 which may
be a difficult task considering the complex role it has in approving drugs.
The FDA accepts applications for drug approval, and determines whether
67
approval for marketing is appropriate based on safety and efficacy studies.
Since an ANDA for a generic drug relies on the studies performed by
pioneer companies, the generic drug companies, in certifying their
68application, are required to refer to a pioneer's listed patent. Thus, the Act
requires that pioneer drug companies provide the FDA with a list of all
69patents that claim an FDA approved drug or a method of using the drug.
When a related patent is issued subsequent to NDA approval, the NDA
holder has thirty days to list the patent with the FDA.7° However, if the
NDA holder does not notify the FDA of the patent, an ANDA applicant is
not required to amend its application to include the late-listed patent.7 Late
listing comports with the dual purposes of the Act by protecting ANDA
filers from having to re-certify late patent submissions, yet allowing NDA
holders to "benefit from the public notice that stems from listing.
' 72
Regardless of the timing of the submission of patents, the list of patents
is published by the FDA in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
66. Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Shalala, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16, n.11 (D.D.C. 2000).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
68. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A).
69. aaiPharma, 296 F.3d at 230; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (c)(2).
70. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2).
71. Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The
FDA refers to the listing of patents subsequent to the thirty days provided as "late listing."
See Shalala, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 11. The FDA regulation regarding "late listing" provides:
If a patent on the listed drug is issued and the holder of the approved application for
the listed drug does not submit the required information on the patent within 30 days of
issuance of the patent, an applicant who submitted an abbreviated new drug applica-
tion for that drug that contained an appropriate patent certification before the submis-
sion of the patent information is not required to submit an amended certification. An
applicant whose abbreviated new drug application is submitted after a late submission
of patent information, or whose pending abbreviated application was previously
submitted but did not contain an appropriate patent certification at the time of the
patent submission, shall submit a certification ... as to that patent.
Id. at 11 n.6 (citing 21 C.F.R. 314.94(a)(12)(vi) (2001)).
72. Id. at 14.
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Equivalence Evaluations, generally referred to as the Orange Book.73
However, the FDA only plays a ministerial role in overseeing the Orange
Book listings.74 The role of the FDA "is not to ensure the correctness of the
list of patents submitted for Orange Book listing, but simply to ensure that
either a patent list has been filed or a declaration has been made that there
are no patents to be listed.,
75
Although the Act does not contain a provision allowing a cause of
action to challenge a listing in the Orange Book,
the FDA has provided a limited process for disputing the accuracy
or relevance of patent information submitted to the FDA and listed
in the Orange Book. One who questions the accuracy of the patent
information may write to the FDA, and the FDA will request that
the applicant confirm the information. According to the FDA's
regulations, however, "[u]nless the application holder withdraws or
amends its patent information in response to FDA's request, the
agency will not change the patent information in the list" and an
ANDA applicant must still make certifications for each patent de-
spite its disagreement.
76
Even so, the FDA warns that if a pioneer company does submit an invalid
list, the company may be liable to the FDA.77
In addition, the generic drug company may still gain approval despite
the improper listing if established by a court order.78 Since the Act does not
require the FDA to review listing of patents in the Orange Book, the
approval of an ANDA with Paragraph IV certification rests on a court's
decision that the ANDA does not infringe upon the listed patent.79
73. See Thompson, 269 F.3d at 1079.
74. aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2002).
75. Id. at 239.
76. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
77. aaiPharma, 296 F.3d at 242.
78. Abbott Labs. v. Novopharm Ltd., 104 F.3d 1305, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
79. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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B. Court Decisions Reflecting Balance
1. Listing of Additional Patents
The listing of additional patents in the Orange Book has not only
caused lawsuits filed by pioneer drug companies against generic drug
companies, but has also led to lawsuits initiated by generic drug companies
against the FDA. A pinnacle case discussing the listing of additional patents
was Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson. In Mylan, a generic drug
company was ready to market their approved drug upon expiration of the
listed pioneer drug, but hours before expiration the pioneer company listed
81
additional patents in the Orange Book. Mylan filed suit against the pioneer
company and the FDA seeking a declaratory judgment that the pioneer
82improperly listed the patent. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court's decision, which directed the
pioneer company to delist its patent from the Orange Book.83 The court held
that there is no private right of action for delisting a patent under the Act.
84
In rendering this decision, the court reviewed the purpose and relevant
legislative history of the Act, and it stated the generic drug company's
claim is not a recognized defense to patent infringement. There is
no indication in 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(III) that Congress in-
tended to provide an additional defense. Instead it indicates that
Congress only envisioned that recognized defenses could be raised
in declaratory judgments in patent infringement actions.... Fi-
nally, the parties have shown nothing in the scant legislative history
of the amendments pointing to an intent to provide such a defense,
or to create a private action for delisting a patent from the Orange
Book for a patentee's failure to comply with section 355.
85
Even though there is no private right of action for delisting a patent,
there may be other avenues to obtain ANDA approval. In another case
80. 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
81. Id. at 1327-28.
82. Id. at 1328.
83. Id. at 1325. The district court reasoned that Mylan was entitled to relief because
Mylan could have used the claim of improper listing as a defense in an infringement suit
initiated by the pioneer company. Id. at 1328.
84. Mylan Pharms., 268 F.3d at 1332.
85. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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before the Federal Circuit, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp.,86
the court suggested in dicta that a generic ANDA applicant could sue the
81FDA directly under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Under the
APA, if the FDA's denial of the ANDA is "arbitrary, capricious, or not in
accordance with law," the FDA may be compelled to approve the ANDA. 8
Therefore, if a generic drug company prevails in an APA claim, the remedy
usually will be vacature of the FDA's order and immediate approval of the
ANDA.89  In addition, the Federal Circuit in Abbott Laboratories v.
Novopharm Ltd. affirmed a lower court decision that a court may order an
additional patent to be delisted by the patent holder.90
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
also rendered a decision involving a claim brought against the FDA under91 92
the APA.9' In American Bioscience v. Thompson, Inc., the patent holder of
a listed drug patent sued the FDA, claiming that the agency acted contrary to
the APA when it approved an ANDA, regardless of the listing of a related
patent in the Orange Book.93 The court vacated the FDA's order approving
the generic, holding that the agency's actions were "arbitrary and capri-
cious.
94
Ultimately, the courts have enforced patent listing in the Orange Book.
The Act specifically empowers the courts to review the validity of patents in
patent infringement suits initiated according to section 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) of
Title 21 of the United States Code.95
2. Paragraph IV Certification
In addition to patent listing disputes, Paragraph IV certification has
stimulated various lawsuits between drug companies. Since a company
submitting a Paragraph IV certification with their ANDA has to wait for
FDA approval to market the drug, there is technically no actual infringement
of the listed patent. However, in Eli Lilly & Co., v. Medronic, Inc. ,96 Justice
86. 276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
87. Id. at 1378; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1379.
90. 104 F.3d 1305, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
91. Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1083.
94. Id. at 1086.
95. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000).
96. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
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Scalia, writing for the United States Supreme Court, stated that submitting
an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification is a "highly artificial act of
infringement., 97  Therefore, the court is allowed to decide whether
infringement will occur, once the drug is marketed upon FDA approval of
98the ANDA. In order to succeed in a patent infringement lawsuit, the
patentee must prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged
infringer will likely market an infringing product." 99  In conducting
infringement analysis the court reviews the ANDA, the materials submitted
to the FDA, and other evidence submitted by the parties. 00
The Federal Circuit recently heard a case concerning the controversial
use of the requirements of the Paragraph IV certification to obtain the 180-
day exclusivity.10' In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Barr
102Laboratories, Inc., a second ANDA filer did not provide enough
information in the required notice of Paragraph IV certification to the NDA
holder. 0 3 The NDA holder subsequently filed a lawsuit against the second
ANDA filer within the forty-five day statutory window of time.' 4  The
initiation of the suit caused ANDA approval of the generic drug to be stayed
for thirty months or until termination of the litigation. 0 5 Through discovery,
the NDA holder was convinced that the second generic applicant did not
infringe on the listed patent held by the pioneer drug company. 06 The NDAholder filed a motion to dismiss the case without prejudice in order to
97. Id. at 678.
98. Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The court
stated:
[S]ection 271 (e)(2)(A) makes it possible for a patent owner to have the court determine
whether, if a particular drug were put on the market, it would infringe the relevant
patent. If the court determines that the patent is not invalid and that infringement
would occur, and that therefore the ANDA applicant's paragraph IV certification is
incorrect, the patent owner is entitled to an order that FDA approval of the ANDA
containing the paragraph IV certification not be effective until the patent expires. See
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(B)(iii)(Il): 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A).
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis in original).
99. Id. at 1570. In Glaxo, the court affirmed the district court's decision that the
patentee, Glaxo, Inc., had not proven infringement of its patents by Novopharm, Ltd. by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1572.
100. Id. at 1570.
101. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 289 F.3d 775 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 779.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 289 F.3d at 779.
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prevent the second ANDA filer from obtaining the 180-day exclusivity.'17
The district court, however, dismissed the case with prejudice, thereby
triggering the exclusivity period.' °8 Subsequently, the NDA holder filed an
appeal of the decision in the Federal Circuit.'0 9 The main issue on appeal
was whether the district court erred in determining that the second ANDA
filer complied with the notice requirement of the Act." 0 On appeal, the
court held that the NDA holder could not "seek a judicial determination of
whether a private party's Paragraph IV certification complies with 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(B)."' i
3. Allegations of Patent Infringement
Although lawsuits initiated by pioneer drug companies have recently
been scrutinized,' 2 it is up to the courts to decide whether the cases are
meritorious. Patent infringement suits initiated by pioneer companies
against ANDA applicants are literally provided for as a method for a generic
drug to enter the market before patent expiration." 3 However, it is the
court's obligation as a tribunal to review the cases for merit and decide
whether the ANDA actually infringes on the listed patent. Patents for
pharmaceutical drugs may be extremely complex and difficult to determine
if they infringe on another patent; therefore, it may be necessary to review
every component of the patent before deciding on the issue of infringement.
For example, in Biovail Corp. International v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,114 the court was faced with determining whether a "homogeneous
admixture" was formed in the generic product, thus infringing on the pioneer
company's patent.' 5 The patent history was reviewed and expert testimony
was heard in order for the court to properly determine the meaning of terms
107. Id. The NDA holder, 3M, felt that the second ANDA filer had tricked 3M into
filing an infringement lawsuit in order to gain the 180-day exclusivity period, although the
ANDA did not infringe the listed patent. Id.
108. Id. The district court found that the second ANDA filer's assurances that the
generic drug did not infringe the listed patent were "'sufficient to satisfy the notice
requirements of the [Act]."' Id. (quoting Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Bar Labs. Inc., 139 F.
Supp. 2d 1109, 1115 (D. Minn. 2001)).
109. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 289 F.3d at 779.
110. Id. at 779-80.
111. Id. at 783.
112. Appleby & O'Donnell, supra note 5.
113. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
114. 239 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
115. 239 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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contained in the patents. 16 The court ultimately determined that the generic
patent did not infringe upon the pioneer patent. 1 7  However, without a
thorough review by the court, the issues of infringement could not have been
properly determined.
Recently, the patent infringement lawsuits commenced by pioneer
companies have been labeled as a frivolous attempt to enjoy the financial
benefits of the thirty-month stay." 18 A recent case decided by the District
Court for the Southern District of New York was confronted with this
proposition." 9  In In re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation,120 the pioneer
company, Bristol-Myers, listed an additional patent in the Orange BookS121
hours before its original patent was to expire. Bristol-Myers claimed that
the new patent "covered a method of using the [pioneer] drug," when the
patent actually did not. 22  However, Bristol-Myers filed suit against the
generic drug company for patent infringement, thereby initiating the thirty-
month stay. 123 The district court judge granted summary judgment of non-
infringement against Bristol-Myers.
124
Following the court's decision, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that
Bristol-Myers abused the provisions of the Act in order to obtain "an
unlawful monopoly over the market."' 125 Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged
that Bristol-Myers exercised bad faith in interfering with the marketing of a
generic version of its drug by abusing the provisions of the Act to obtain the
thirty-month stay. 26 In granting a pre-trial motion in this case, the court
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1305.
118. See Appleby & O'Donnell, supra note 5. The authors discuss the problems with
the thirty-month stay, stating:
Because blockbuster drugs-those earning more than $1 billion a year-are so profit-
able, antitrust enforcers say the firms will try almost anything to keep the market to
themselves, even for a few additional months. The companies spend millions of dollars
pursuing patent-infringement lawsuits or cutting deals with potential generic competi-
tors because the potential payoff is so huge.
Id.
119. In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
119. Id. at 516.
121. Id. at 518-19.
122. Id. at 519.
123. Id.
124. Buspirone, 208 F.R.D. at 518.
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stated that Bristol-Myers had to be active in the litigation process or the
court would order the stay terminated. 127
The courts involved in Bristol-Myers' attempt to delay the introduction
of generic drugs onto the market have disposed of the cases properly. The
case is an example of courts' roles in assuring that pioneer companies do not
take unfair advantage of the stay provided to them in patent infringement
suits. Although pioneer companies at times abuse the provisions of the Act
establishing the thirty-month stay of generic drug approval, the courts have
adequately prevented the abuse by granting motions for summary judgment
in favor of generic companies.128 In fact, provisions of the Act specifically
authorize courts to shorten the thirty-month stay if "either party to the action
fail[s] to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action."'
' 29
As part of a litigious society, pioneer companies are justified in
protecting their legal rights and interests. It is up to the courts "to determine
whether the parties are complying with that requirement of the statute."' 3°
Although a trend has been set by Mylan and Andrx regarding the consistently
discussed issues of the Act, involving patents to be settled by the APA,'
31
courts are still "in the best position to assess the conduct of the parties and
grant appropriate relief."' 3  Furthermore, if a pioneer company alleges
patent infringement and a court rules that the generic company did not
infringe on the patent, the generic company also has the opportunity to sue
for attorneys' fees.
4. Exceptional Cases for Attorneys' Fees
The patent code allows the court to award attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party "in exceptional cases."1 33 Types of misconduct that lead to
127. Id. at 525.
128. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc. 289 So. F.3d 775 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Abbott Labs. V. Vovopharm Ltd., 104 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re
Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
129. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs.,
Inc., 295 F.3d 1274, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating "if an NDA holder sought to delay the
litigation [and thus prolong its exclusivity] by challenging compliance with § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii),
the district court could expedite the suit so as to mitigate any timing advantage the NDA
holder might have gained.").
130. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 295 F.3d at 1276.
131. Id. at 1277 (referring to Mylan Pharms, Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) and Andrx Pharms., Inc., v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
132. Id.
133. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
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an exceptional case include "willful infringement, inequitable conduct
before the [Patent Trademark Office], offensive litigation tactics, vexatious
or unjustified litigation, or frivolous filings."' 34 Exceptions have been based
not only on the actions of pioneer companies, but also on the actions of
generic drug companies. For example, in Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co.
v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 135 the court found that the generic drug
company, Danbury, had willfully infringed on the pioneer company's
patent.1 6 The court determined that the actions by Danbury, in willfully
infringing on the patent, constituted an exceptional case for an award of
attorney fees to Yamanouchi.1
37
Conversely, there have been cases in which courts have not found an
exceptional case to merit an award of attorneys' fees. In Merck & Co. v.
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' 38 the generic drug company, Mylan, was
granted summary judgment on non-infringement and later initiated a motion
to recover attorneys' fees on the basis that Merck "engaged in vexatious or
unjustified litigation techniques in order to delay FDA approval of Mylan's
generic compound and increase the burdens on Mylan."' The court denied
the motion, holding that "the evidence ... does not meet the clear and
convincing standard of outrageous or exceptional behavior which warrants
an award of attorney fees."'' 40 The judge further acknowledged:
Merck's infringement claim, albeit erroneous, was not baseless. Its
course of conduct in pursuing the claim was neither vexatious, un-
usual nor disproportionate to the rather high stakes involved. Fi-
nally, Merck's alternate form of relief, whether meritorious or not,
cannot alone support an award of one and a half million dollars in
attorneys fees, especially when the claim was never pursued by
either party. 141
134. Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted) (citing Avia Group Int'l., Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc.,
853 F.2d 1557, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727
F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed, Inc., 213 F.3d 1359,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547,
1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
135. Id. at 1339.
136. Id. at 1341.
137. Id. at 1343.
138. 79 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
139. Id. at 553.
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Ultimately, the interpretation of whether actions meet the "exceptional"
standard is up to the courts to determine in awarding attorneys' fees.
V. UNNECESSARY REFORMATION OF THE ACT
A. Proposed Reformation
On May 7, 2001, Senators John McCain and Charles Schumer
introduced a bill in the United States Senate to amend the Act in order "to
loosen the restrictions on generic ANDA applicants."'' 42  The proposed
purposes of the Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2001
are: "(1) to increase competition, thereby helping all Americans, especially
seniors and the uninsured, to have access to more affordable medication; and
(2) to ensure fair marketplace practices and deter pharmaceutical companies
(including generic companies) from engaging in anticompetitive action or
actions that tend to unfairly restrain trade.' 43 The bill is estimated to save
consumers sixty billion dollars in prescription drugs, but, this estimate is
"highly speculative" according to the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America.'4 The terms of the bill include, among other
things, amending the thirty-month stay provision "by preventing any stay for
patents listed after the initial NDA filing (even if they are listed before an
ANDA is submitted).' 45
142. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see
Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2001, S. 812, 107th Cong. (2001).
143. S.812.
144. Senator Schumer Claims His Bill Saves Consumers Money-But How Much?, at
http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/25.07.2002.467.cfm (July 25, 2002). The
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America notes that
over 60% of total savings are predicted to take place in 2010-12-and nominal in
comparison to the savings conferred by a prescription drug benefit. Further, these
savings do not consider the ultimate cost of S.812. The uncertainty created by the bill
may jeopardize the lengthy, costly research needed to develop new cures and better
treatments.
Id., at http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/25.07.2002.467.cfm (July 25, 2002).
145. Points on the FTC Report vs. S. 812, at
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B. Compromising Patent Rights
The major problem with the proposed bill is it does not comply with the
original purposes of the Act. Recall that one of the purposes of the Act is to
provide pioneer companies with patent term restoration for the time spent in
obtaining FDA approval.146 The bill instead "would forfeit the patent rights
of the innovator companies altogether if they do not comply with the bill's
arbitrary procedural requirements."
47
Moreover, a patent is presumed to be valid unless proven by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. 148 Perhaps some drug companies are
initiating infringement suits against generic companies to illegitimately
prolong entrance of generics on the market; however, other infringement
suits are created to resolve valid patent disputes. 149  Patent rights give
pioneer companies an incentive to devote time and finances to research and
develop new drugs "that are expensive to [initially] produce but quite
inexpensive to copy.' 50  Generic drug companies take advantage of the
benefits of provisions of the Act, and then criticize the parts of the Act that
benefit pioneer companies. However, the Act was not written solely to
benefit generic drug companies.' 5 1 The Act is a compromise between patent
restoration for pioneer companies and the speedy introduction of generics
into the market.
52
C. Reduction of Incentives for New Drug Innovation
The reformation of the Act would also contravene the very purpose of
Title II of the Act, which "is to create a new incentive for increased
expenditures for research and development of certain products which are
146. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648.
147. Points on the FTC Report vs. S.812, at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/quickfacts/30.07.2002.295.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003)
(emphasis in original).
148. Engelberg, supra note 21, at 422 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1994)); see 35
U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
149. See Glasgow, supra note 13, at 238-39.
150. Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing
Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. I11. L. Rev. 173,
181 (2001).
151. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 15, 37 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2648, 2670.
152. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647.
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subject to premarket government approval."'' 53 The process of introducing a
new drug to the market is very time consuming. The drug development
process itself takes an estimated fourteen years and seven months to
complete. 154 Generic drug development, on the other hand, takes only
approximately three to five years. 15 However, "there is no real incentive to
develop a generic drug until the market has been established and any post-
approval issues of safety and efficacy have been resolved by broad use in the
general population. The fact is that forty-nine percent of drugs
prescribed are generic. 57 Moreover, since 1984, "[o]f the 8,000 drugs that
have come off patent ... 94% moved from brand name to generic without a
patent dispute."
58
Nevertheless, without the option to litigate a patent dispute, the purpose
of the Act's patent term restoration provision would be meaningless.
59
Patent term restoration gives drug companies the incentive to introduce new• ~160 ••
drugs into the market. By revising the Act to prevent "the ability of brand-
name companies to automatically win those 30 months of exclusivity,"'
6
'
there will be no way to adequately assure that pioneer companies are
provided with the patent term restoration they deserve. Pioneer companies
should not be disadvantaged by a loss in ability to enforce their patent rights.
Regardless, the ability of pioneer companies to protect their finances gained
through the marketing exclusivity of drugs further promotes discovery and
research of new drugs, which in turn may later be copied into an inexpensive
generic version.
153. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648.
154. Richard J. Findlay, Originator Drug Development, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 227
(1999). There are four phases to the drug development process:
During the clinical testing period, originators conduct tests for safety in Phase I,
efficacy in Phase II, and for side effects and long-term use effects in Phase In... prior
to submitting a new drug application (NDA) and receiving Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) approval. After FDA approval, postmarketing testing continues in Phase
IV for, inter alia, side effects, clinical education, and possible new indications.
Id.
155. Id. at 229.
156. Engelberg, supra note 21, at 406.
157. Appleby & O'Donnell, supra note 5, at 2A.
158. Id. (discussing the response of Jeff Trewhitt, spokesman for the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufactures of America, to the proposed legislation to change the Act).
159. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648.
160. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 17, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650.
161. Appleby & O'Donnell, supra note 5, at 2A.
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VI. CONCLUSION
"The Congressional policy with respect to generic drugs is clear:
generic manufacturing of a drug should be allowed as soon as it is
determined that it does not violate patent rights."'' 62 Congress was not only
concerned with marketing generics faster in order to save consumers money,
but also with not violating the patent rights of pioneer companies. However,
problems have arisen that have instigated the idea in the minds of generic
drug companies and legislators that the Act needs to be reformed. Through
analysis of the Act and court cases, it is apparent that the true problem with
the Act is the Paragraph IV certification. It allows generic drug companies
to challenge a pioneer company's listed patent. In essence, when a generic
drug company files an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification, it should
expect the pioneer company to fight for its patent rights. If a generic drug
company wants to enter the market before the pioneer patent has expired, the
generic is going to have to fight for the position. Patent rights provide
innovators with the exclusive right to sell the product for the patent term.
"Exclusive" is the key term. If a generic drug company wants to challenge
the validity of a patent listed in the Orange Book, then it must take the issue
to court. Complaining about the drafting of the Act does not further the
goals the Act was set forth to accomplish.
To review, the purpose of the Act is to promote the availability of
generic drugs and to give back pioneers some of the patent protection time
lost in the drug approval process. 163  Redrafting the Act to make the
provisions of the Act weigh more heavily towards only promoting the
availability of generics would go against the very purpose of the Act. If the
Act were meant to only benefit generic drug companies then the official
name of the Act would not have included the terms "Patent Term Restora-
tion." The Act has provided generic drug companies with an opportunity to
save money in discovery and research, which in turn saves consumers
millions of dollars. If any reform is necessary, it is the reform of the FDA's
role in administering the Act. The FDA should be responsible for ove-
rseeing that a patent listed in the Orange Book actually "claims the drug...
or which claims a method of using such drug."' 164 Although the FDA claims
162. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 289 F.3d 775, 786 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(emphasis added).
163. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647-48.
164. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2) (2000). The pioneer company is required to file any patents
issued after the NDA was approved, no later than thirty days after the patent was issued. Id.
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that this may not be feasible due to the scientific expertise required to
interpret the patents, perhaps the FDA should consider hiring a few patent
attorneys and pharmaceutical experts. Reformation of the Act is an
unnecessary resolution to the underlying problem-administration of the
Act.
However, according to the provisions of the Act, the courts are responsible for determining
whether the patent is valid. See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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